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KILLING A CHICKEN TO SCARE THE MONKEY: THE 
UNEQUAL ADMINISTRATION OF DEATH IN CHINA 
Jessica J. Shen † 
Abstract: China’s frequent usage of the death penalty in order to achieve 
deterrence of crime is well known to the international community; however, China also 
has a strong tradition of legal mercy stemming from imperial rule.  In turn, imperial legal 
mercy originated from Confucian values of benevolence and humaneness.  Although 
modern China emerged as a rejection of Imperial China’s Confucian hierarchal social 
structures, these cultural traditions have endured.  For example, Confucianism’s humane 
influence can be seen in statutory and procedural mechanisms demonstrating benevolence 
towards criminals.  However, only applying this benevolence to a select group of people 
betrays modern China’s statutory and political objectives of egalitarianism and is 
inconsistent with Imperial China’s use of legal mercy. 
 China creates a contradiction in its criminal justice system when it grants legal 
mercy for corrupt government officials but not for those convicted of other serious crimes.  
Although China has made great strides in curtailing death penalty sentences, only 
exercising benevolence toward a certain group of people contradicts the cultural, 
philosophical, and legal principles of benevolence and egalitarianism.  As a result, if legal 
mercy is applied to anyone, it must be applied to all, not just those with political power.  
The current usage of legal mercy for corrupt officials should be instructive for moving 
towards a more merciful system for all.   
I. INTRODUCTION  
In July 2013, China’s former Railways Minister, Liu Zhijun, was 
given a suspended death sentence for corruption and abuse of power, 
including accepting bribes totaling more than USD 10 million over twenty-
five years in exchange for government rail contracts.1  The high-speed 
railway network under Liu Zhijun’s purview experienced numerous safety 
scandals involving a series of accidents.2  In July 2011, a train crash in 
Wenzhou killed forty people due to design flaws and lax security standards.3  
This scandal is merely one example in a pattern of corruption stemming 
from China’s transition into a market economy in the 1980s, which increased 
the typical citizen’s standard of living and granted local officials an 
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1  China Ex-Rail Minister Given the Suspended Death Sentence, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23222240 (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
2  Id. 
3  China Bullet Train Crash ‘Caused by Design Flaws’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 28, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-16345592 (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
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enormous amount of power that many exploited for financial gain.4  Since 
then, China has been plagued with abuses of power by hundreds of officials 
at high levels of government, including provincial vice-governor and vice-
minister.5  Between December 2012 and June 2013, almost 2,300 officials 
have been penalized for graft and wasteful spending.6  As the most high 
profile official to be found guilty of corruption under Xi Jinping’s 
administration, Liu’s conviction coincides with Xi Jinping’s pledge to crack 
down on corruption, taking on the “powerful ‘tigers’ at the top to the ‘flies’ 
at the bottom of the Communist Party.”7  Indeed, Liu Zhijun’s indictment 
alleged that his negligence led to huge losses of public assets as well as 
damage to state and citizen interests.8  Although the law permitted a death 
penalty sentence for extreme corruption,9  the court showed Liu Zhijun 
mercy in issuing a suspended death sentence because those are generally 
commuted to life imprisonment.10  Liu Zhijun’s suspended death sentence is 
merely one example of a trend where Chinese courts take “a different 
approach” in sentencing corrupt government officials compared with the 
general population.11   
China’s leniency towards corrupt government officials stands in stark 
contrast with the vast amount of people executed in general.  Although the 
Chinese government classifies the full scope of its death penalty usage as a 
state secret, even official statistics chronicle increasing numbers of 
executions throughout the 1990s.12   This trend has continued into the 
twenty-first century; since at least 2005, China has had the most confirmed 
executions in the world.13  Amnesty International reported that China likely 
executed between 1000 to 2000 people a year between 2005 and 2013, but 
                                                      
4  Ji Zhebu, Officials: A Matter of Faith, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 10, 2013), http://usa.chinadaily.com. 
cn/epaper/2013-10/10/content_17021185.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
5  Tang Yue et al., New Study Reveals Corruption Pattern, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90785/8373734.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014); see Eliminating Corruption is 
CPC’s Long-Term Task, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (July 4, 2013), http://english.people.com. 
cn/90785/8311677.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
6  Zhou Wenting, ‘Guilty Officials Should be Charged’, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (China) (June 14, 
2013), http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206976/8284829.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
7  China Ex-Rail Minister Given the Suspended Death Sentence, supra note 1.  
8  Id.  
9  See Mimi Lau, Death Penalty in China Linked to Social Inequality, Says Critics, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1328159/death-penalty-china-
linked-social-inequality-say-critics (last visited May 6, 2014). 
10  China Ex-Rail Minister Given the Suspended Death Sentence, supra note 1. 
11  See Mimi Lau, supra note 9. 
12  Peter Nestor, When the Price is Too High: Rethinking China’s Deterrence Strategy for Robbery, 
16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 525, 535 (2007). 
13  See The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-international-perspective (last visited May 6, 2014). 
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because death penalty figures are a state secret the total number may be 
much higher.14  In March 2004, Chinese media published an unofficial report 
finding that the courts sentence 10,000 people to death every year in China, 
not including people sentenced to death with two-year suspensions.15  The 
Dui Hua Foundation16 estimated that China executed as many as 12,000 
people in 2002, 8000 people in 2005, 6500 people in 2007, 4000 people in 
2012,17  and 3000 people in 2013.18  In contrast, Iran—the country with the 
second greatest number of executions between 2005 and 2013—executed at 
most around 388 people a year.19  Additionally, while the United States 
executed a total of 1373 people since 1976,20 official statistics reveal that 
China executed 6100 people in 1996 alone. 21   
China continues to execute a large numbers of criminals because of 
the longstanding belief that the death penalty serves as an effective deterrent 
to crime.22  In fact, common sayings include “executing one deters one 
hundred”23 and “killing a chicken to scare the monkey.”24  Not only do most 
Chinese citizens believe that the death penalty carries strong educational 
value, but the government utilizes the death penalty as a matter of public 
policy.25  Judicial officials often defend China’s usage of the death penalty 
by stating that the “nation is at a stage of development where the death 
penalty is necessary as a deterrent.”26  For example, one Chinese high court 
official said that deterrence is the goal because “by killing one, we educate 
one hundred.”27  However, there is no convincing evidence that the death 
penalty is an effective deterrent.28 
                                                      
14  See id. 
15  JIANFU CHEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA: COMMENTARY AND LEGISLATION 49 (Gabi Duigu eds., 2013). 
16  Dui Hua is a nonprofit organization promoting the recognition of human rights in China.  About 
Dui Hua, THE DUI HUA FOUNDATION, http://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=185 (last visited May 6, 2014). 
17  Criminal Justice, THE DUI HUA FOUNDATION, http://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=136 (last visited 
May 6, 2014). 
18  The Death Penalty in China, DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE, http://www.deathpenalty 
worldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=China#f33-2 (last visited May 6, 2014). 
19  The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, supra note 13.  
20  U.S. Executions Since 1976, THE CLARK COUNTY PROSECUTING ATT’Y, 
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/usexecute.htm (last visited May 6, 2014). 
21  Nestor, supra note 12, at 535.  
22   Shanhe Jiang et al., Death Penalty Views in China, Japan and the U.S.: An Empirical Comparison, 
38 J. CRIM. JUST. 862, 864 (2010); Bin Liang, et al., Sources of Variation in Pro-Death Penalty Attitudes in 
China, BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 119, 121-22 (2006).   
23  Shanhe Jiang et al., supra note 22, at 864. 
24  Id.   
25  See id.  
26  Mimi Lau, supra note 9.  
27  Id.  
28  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/NatResCouncil-Deterr.pdf; EDITORIALS: Evidence Does Not 
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Based on known statistics China executed about 1.5% of its 1350 
million person population in 2012;29 however, this comment does not focus 
on China’s general usage of the death penalty.  Rather, it addresses the 
contradiction created in the Chinese criminal justice system when China 
grants legal mercy for corrupt government officials but not for those 
convicted of other serious crimes.  Information on the exact number of death 
penalty sentences and how many are imposed for particular crimes is 
“incomplete and unreliable” because the government considers it a state 
secret.30  However, reports from both within China and in the international 
community raise concerns about the link between China’s death penalty 
usage and social inequality.31  In particular, the news media have noted a 
judicial trend granting lighter punishments for government officials or 
politically connected individuals, but not for those without political power.32  
Although China has recently made great strides in attempting to curtail the 
total number of death penalty sentences, 33 only exercising benevolence 
toward a certain group of people contradicts China’s cultural, philosophical, 
and legal principles of benevolence and egalitarianism.   
China’s extensive tradition of legal mercy balances out the belief that 
the death penalty deters crime.34  The Confucian principle of benevolence 
that encouraged humaneness in the criminal justice system was prominent in 
imperial China and survives today,35 despite attacks on Confucianism in 
recent Chinese history.36  In particular, Confucian benevolence manifests in 
the lenient features of Chinese criminal law,37 especially restorative practices 
such as mediation38 and community-based corrections,39 as well as the focus 
on balancing leniency and rigidity in criminal justice policies.40  Despite its 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Support Death Penalty As Deterrent, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
editorials-evidence-does-not-support-death-penalty-deterrent (last visited Apr. 8, 2014); Bin Liang, supra 
note 22, at 121-22. 
29  See 2012 World Population Data Sheet, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 
http://www.prb.org/pdf12/2012-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf (last visited May 6, 2014); The Death 
Penalty: An International Perspective, supra note 13.   
30  Nestor, supra note 12, at 535.  
31  See, e.g., Mimi Lau, supra note 9.  
32  Id. 
33  See infra Part IV.A 
34  Jianhong Liu et al., Chinese Legal Traditions: Punitiveness Versus Mercy, 9 ASIA PAC. J. POLICE 
& CRIM. JUST. 17, 22 (2012). 
35  Id. at 24. 
36  See id.   
37  Id. at 24.   
38  Victim-offender mediation is often practiced to seek a settlement in less severe or misdemeanor 
cases.  Id. at 25.  It requires the voluntary participation of the offender and victim, compliance with the 
relevant laws and regulations, and that either party can suspend mediation to seek formal trial.  Id.   
39  Id. at 26.  
40  Id. at 27.  
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extremely high number of executions, China recently made efforts to curb its 
use of the death penalty,41 to debatable effect.42  However, the general 
consensus that use of the death penalty deters crime still drives court 
convictions.43  Given that more executions likely do not achieve deterrence44 
and the deep-rooted influence of Confucian legal mercy, it would better 
serve both Chinese cultural traditions and the goal of deterrence to apply 
benevolence to everyone, not just corrupt government officials.  
Part II of this comment explains why deterrence cannot justify harsh 
death penalty policies.  Part III describes the endurance of the traditional 
Confucian value of benevolence through balancing severity and mercy.  In 
particular, this demonstrates the importance of preserving legal mercy in 
modern Chinese law.  Part IV argues that failing to apply legal mercy to all 
criminals creates a philosophical and legal contradiction.  This inequality 
betrays both Communist China’s goal of an egalitarian society and 
Confucian benevolence.  Finally, Part V posits the following solutions to 
resolve this inequality:  1) publishing Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) 
guidance cases so lower courts may better determine which cases are severe 
enough to warrant the death penalty, 2) mandating greater usage of 
mitigation factors when considering a potential death penalty case, and 3) 
establishing a formal clemency procedure.  
II. THE DEATH PENALTY DOES NOT DETER CRIMES 
Crimes rates over the past twenty-five years reveal the ineffectiveness 
of China’s current deterrence strategy,45 even official statistics reveal that 
crime rates have risen dramatically since the early 1980s.46  The Government 
initiated a national “Strike Hard” campaign as a response to this increase in 
crime,47 which led to widespread and extreme applications of the death 
penalty. 48   This campaign encompassed mass arrests, rapid and harsh 
sentencing, mass rallies, and propaganda.49  Though it began with the strong 
                                                      
41  See Na Jiang, A Comparison of Wrongful Convictions in Death Penalty Cases Between China and 
the United States, 41 INT’L J.L. CRIME & JUST. 144, 151-52 (2013); Margaret K. Lewis, Leniency and 
Severity in China’s Death Penalty Debate, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 303, 306 (2011). 
42  See, e.g., Chris Hogg, China Ends Death Penalty for 13 Economic Crimes, BBC NEWS (Feb. 25, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12580504 (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
43  See infra Part III.  
44  See supra text accompanying  note 28.    
45  Nestor, supra note 12, at 525-26.  
46  Id. at 526.  
47  See Børge Bakken, Moral Panics, Crime Rates and Harsh Punishment in China, 37 AUSTL. & N.Z. 
J. CRIMINOLOGY 67, 69 (2004). 
48  Nestor, supra note 12, at 539. 
49  Id. 
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Legalist belief that harsh punishments deter crime, this strategy failed.50  The 
government attempted nationwide “Strike Hard” campaigns from 1983 to 
1987, as well as in 1996,51 but each campaign failed to reduce the crime 
rate.52  In fact, the largest spikes in crime between 1981 and 2001 occurred 
soon after “Strike Hard” campaigns.53  Chinese scholars note that focusing 
solely on severe punishments was a “futile strategy” to deter crime that 
resulted in a waste of law enforcement resources and prevented police from 
implementing crime prevention tactics.54  In particular, preventive social 
order management activities such as patrolling, strengthening neighborhood 
resident groups, and managing guns “slip by the wayside” because local 
police are under “terrific pressure from above to show statistical results.”55  
Instead, law enforcement personnel focus their energy “almost exclusively” 
on investigation, attacks, and arrests in order to adhere to the “Strike Hard” 
campaign’s mandate. 56   In hindsight, the “Strike Hard” campaigns 
significantly increased the number of capital sentences. 
Although there is much debate over whether the death penalty actually 
deters crime,57  research examining homicide rates in the United States 
demonstrates that factors other than the death penalty explain the rise and 
fall of crime rates.58  California, New York, and Texas all experienced a rise 
in homicides in the late 1970s and late 1980s, before the rates declined 
dramatically.59  From 1974 to 2009, all three states’ homicide rates “tracked 
virtually identically.”60  However, while Texas executed 447 people during 
that period, California only executed thirteen people and New York executed 
no one.61   
Like the United States, China witnessed an increase in crime in the 
late 1980s.62  The parallel data can be attributed to the demographics of 
juveniles at the time: as China’s juvenile delinquency rate rose, baby-
boomers entered the age range of fourteen to twenty-five, the age range in 
which people are statistically most likely to commit crimes.63  Not only did 
                                                      
50  Id. at 527. 
51  Id. at 539.   
52  Id. at 539, 540-41.  
53  Id. at 541.  
54  Id.  
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 2. 
58  See EDITORIALS: Evidence Does Not Support Death Penalty as Deterrent, supra note 28. 
59  Id.  
60  Id. 
61  Id.  
62  Nestor, supra note 12, at 526. 
63  Bakken, supra note 47, at 68-69. 
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the population of fourteen to twenty-five year-olds rise dramatically from 
120 million to 272 million between 1965 and 1987, but the juvenile crime 
rate decreased from seventy-six percent in 1988 to forty-two percent in 
2001.64  The decline in juvenile crime correlates with the baby-boomer 
generation aging out of that fourteen to twenty-five year-old range.65  As a 
result, the passage of time is the probable explanation for the rise and fall of 
crime rates in China, not the frequency with which the government invoked 
the death penalty.  
The absence of correlation between the increased usage of the death 
penalty and a decrease in crime demonstrates that, at the very least, officials 
should not use the death penalty specifically to deter crime.  If the Chinese 
government is willing to attempt reforms for the economic crimes of corrupt 
public officials, 66  then it must also improve sentencing procedures to 
properly exercise the principle of benevolence for everyone else.  Otherwise, 
punishing ordinary citizens without political power under the guise of 
deterring serious violent crime betrays China’s philosophical, political, and 
legal traditions. 
III. THE REEMERGENCE OF TRADITIONAL CONFUCIAN VALUES OF 
DETERRENCE THROUGH SEVERITY AND MERCY IN MODERN CHINA 
The current Chinese criminal justice system focuses heavily on 
deterrence through punitive measures.67  From 2006 to 2012, forty million 
nightly viewers watched the Chinese television series “Interviews Before 
Execution,” where controversial death row inmates such as a couple who 
killed the boyfriend’s grandmother spoke with “in-your-face” host Ding Yu 
about their crimes.68  During these interviews, Ding Yu propagated the 
show’s mission to deter crime by insulting inmates, informing them that they 
were dangers to society, and telling one man that his family had no interest 
in seeing him before he died.69  The government approved the show as a 
potential crime deterrent because it showed the “misery that awaits” those 
                                                      
64  Id. at 69.  
65  Id. 
66  Ji Zhebu, Crime and Punishment for Corrupt Officials, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-08/29/content_16929435.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
67  See Lewis, supra note 41, at 304. 
68  Forty million viewers is almost half of Henan Province’s population and 1.25 times the number of 
Americans who watched the closing ceremonies of the Olympic. Caitlin Dewey, In China, Death Row 
Entertainment is Nothing New, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/01/in-china-death-row-entertainment-is-nothing-new/. 
69  Id.  
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who face the death penalty.70  The head of the television channel stated that 
it was good for society because the government “want[s] the audience to be 
warned . . . if they are warned, tragedies might be averted.”71  Although the 
current attitude toward the use of the death penalty is changing, the majority 
of Chinese citizens still believe it effectively deters crime.72   
Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1911, the Chinese 
government’s ideological goals and values have been in flux, 73  often 
adjusting depending on the current political, social, and economic context.74  
Communist China initially rejected Confucianism, but since the late 1970s, 
traditional Chinese teachings have resurfaced, ironically, to generate loyalty 
and preserve Party structures.75  Although modern China rejected imperial 
traditions,76 the “umbilical cord between the Confucian tradition and modern 
China . . . cannot be easily severed.”77  Due to its status as China’s official 
ideology from the second century AD to the early twentieth century, 
Confucianism functioned as the dominant source of Chinese cultural 
principles.78  Confucian principles are so incorporated in Chinese society 
that even anti-Confucian movements such as the May Fourth Movement and 
the Cultural Revolution did not “radically alter” these internalized 
elements. 79   In fact, lawmakers ratified benevolent principles, such as 
mitigating factors, into the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter “Criminal Law”). 80   Confucian principles of mercy and 
                                                      
70  Mark McDonald, On a New TV Show in China, Cue the Firing Squad, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/on-a-new-tv-show-in-china-cue-the-firing-squad/?_r=0. 
71  Id. 
72  See Shanhe Jiang et al., supra note 22, at 866. 
73  See generally, William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 707, 707-35 (1985). 
74  Bin Liang et al., supra note 22, at 120.   
75  Party leaders opposed Confucianism’s historical link with hierarchies.  H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL 
TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 308 (2007).  Communist China “radically 
rejected Confucianism, seeing it as the root of China’s malaise and inferiority.”  LI-HSIANG LISA ROSENLEE, 
CONFUCIANISM AND WOMEN: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION 1 (2007).  China also carried out a purge 
of Confucianism during the Chinese Cultural Revolution.  Id. 
76  See XIANFA pmbl. (1982) (China), available at http://english.people.com.cn/ 
constitution/constitution.html (stating that “[t]he Revolution of 1911 . . . abolished the feudal monarchy and 
gave birth to the Republic of China. But the Chinese people had yet to fulfill their historical task of 
overthrowing imperialism and feudalism. After waging hard . . . [they] overthrew the rule of imperialism, 
feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism . . . and founded the People’s Republic of China.”). 
77  Hang Lin, On Being Confucians? Confucian Traditions, and the Modern Chinese Society, 4 
EXCURSIONS, 1, 7 (2013). 
78  Ying Zhu, The Confucian Tradition and Chinese Television Today, N.Y. TIMES (April 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-media-003.html. 
79  Id.  
80  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 
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benevolence also exist in various legal provisions and criminal justice 
system practices such as mediation81 and community correction.82  Although 
initially thrown out as a source of social inequality, traditional Confucian 
values and ideology “remain a driving force in Communist China even 
without official recognition.”83  Not only did A) Imperial China utilize a 
balance of severity and legal mercy as an essential component of its criminal 
justice system, but B) this tradition of legal mercy endures despite recent 
attempts to eradicate all traces of Confucianism from modern China.  
A. Imperial China Utilized a Balance of Legalist Severity and Confucian 
Humaneness in Its Criminal Justice System to Achieve Deterrence 
Criminal law formed the basis of China’s ancient legal system.84  
Since Imperial Chinese law intended to “control undesirable social behavior 
as well as change people’s hearts,”85 lawmakers sought to deter crime.86  The 
emphasis on deterrence in Imperial China’s criminal justice system stems 
from the combined influence of Confucianism and Legalism on Imperial 
China’s customary legal thought. 87   Confucianism advocates legal 
humanism, 88  believing that the social order could be maintained with 
“exemplary conduct” by the emperor89 and “willingness to compromise” by 
the people.90  Even when people broke the law, Confucianism dictated that 
the punishment be appropriate to the educational reform of the individual.91  
On the other hand, the Legalist school of thought contends that only extreme 
brutality and torture deters crime.92  Although Chinese emperors ostensibly 
acted on their beliefs that harsh punishments deter crime,93 Confucianism’s 
                                                                                                                                                                 
14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 17-19, 49 (China), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/ 
Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm. 
81  Jianhong Liu et al., supra note 34, at 24.  
82  Id. at 26. 
83  XIN REN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADITION: LAW, STATE, AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL IN CHINA 48 (1997). 
84  See Duan Xiaosong, Criminal Liability of Arbitrators in China: Analysis and Proposals for 
Reform, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 2, 33-34 (2014).  
85  XIN REN, supra note 83, at 42.  
86  Confucius advocated education as a means of preventing crime.  Jianhong Liu et al., supra note 34, 
at 21. 
87  LiYing Li & Yue Ma, Adjudication and Legal Reforms in Contemporary China, 26 J. CONTEMP. 
CRIM. JUST. 36, 37 (2010). 
88  See Hong Lu & Lening Zhang, Death Penalty in China: The Law and the Practice, 33 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 367, 367 (2005). 
89  Id. at 368.  
90  Id.  
91  Id.  
92  Børge Bakken, China, a Punitive Society?, 6 ASIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 33, 36, 38 (2011). 
93  Bin Liang et al., supra note 22, at 120. 
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emphasis on benevolence and humanism often led to mitigation of the 
punishment’s severity, as well as amnesties.94  As a result, throughout its 
long history, Imperial China did not rely on the rule of law to maintain 
order.  Instead, it utilized Confucianism and Legalism as a “double source of 
authority” in which the former’s focus on self-regulated morality and 
behavior was thought to provide enough incentive to avoid the latter’s 
ruthless punishments. 95   Thus, Imperial Chinese law only applied to 
individuals who did not adhere to Confucianism’s code of ethics, which 
emphasized social harmony above all else.96  The law did not protect civil 
liberties, because individual rights were not as important as harmony.97  
Even though deterrence remained the ultimate goal,98 there was also a 
strong tradition of mercy, flexibility, and compassion in Imperial China.99  
Authorities’ methods of achieving deterrence were more varied.100  Officials 
in Imperial China extensively exercised legal mercy, which stemmed from 
Confucian principles.101  Official records document thousands of amnesties 
granted to “the whole empire,”102 including pardoning criminals, commuting 
their sentences, and extending “special benefits to reabsorb [them] back into 
the society.”103  Not only did this practice enable emperors to represent 
themselves as merciful and just, but it also “demonstrated the redemptive 
power of the Confucian morality and humanitarianism.”104  As a result, legal 
mercy mitigated Legalism’s harsh punishments to create a balanced use of 
the double source of authority105 in order to deter crime.106  In fact, some 
analysts contend that early modern Western Europe used the death penalty 
and torture more frequently and publically than Imperial China. 107  
Additionally, a Tang Dynasty emperor briefly abolished the death penalty 
from 747 to 759 AD.108  The regularity of granting ordinary amnesties that 
reduced criminal penalties as well as “great acts of mercy” 109  varied 
                                                      
94  Bakken, supra note 92, at 38.  
95  LiYing Li & Yue Ma, supra note 87, at 37. 
96  Id.  
97  Id. at 39. 
98  Bakken, supra note 92, at 38. 
99  Id. 
100  Id.  
101  Id. at 37.   
102  Id. at 38. 
103  SRINI SITARAMAN, STATE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL TREATY REGIMES 222 (2013). 
104  Id. 
105  See LiYing Li & Yue Ma, supra note 87, at 37. 
106  See Bakken, supra note 92, at 38. 
107  Id. at 36, 37. 
108  Id. 
109  “Great acts of mercy” completely forgave an individual for their crime.  Id. at 38.  
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depending on the dynasty, but Imperial China consistently practiced each 
until the end of imperial rule110 in 1911.111  
Imperial law generally ignored the offender’s mental condition, but 
officials utilized mitigating factors such as the offender’s pregnancy, age, or 
disability in granting mercy or remission of the penalty.112  The application 
of mercy depended on the Confucian tradition of moral self-
internalization.113  In other words, if a criminal voluntarily surrendered, 
admitted guilt, and demonstrated repentance, authorities would grant him 
mercy.114  Imperial China’s criminal justice system emphasized waiting a 
reasonable period of time for repentance or confession so people could 
reflect on the nature and consequences of their actions.115  This principle 
even allowed criminals to be tried for fleeing from the authorities rather than 
for their original crime if they were captured by authorities before the time 
limit for reflection expired.116   
Confucianism’s “profound impact on the ancient Chinese legal 
system” as a source of Imperial China’s tradition of mercy can be seen in the 
gradual adoption of more lenient means of dealing with criminal cases after 
the Western Han Dynasty.117  Emperor Han Wen Di (180-157 BC) abolished 
corporeal punishment during his reign after the case of “Ti Ying saving her 
father.” 118   When Ti Ying’s father committed a crime deserving the 
punishment of having his nose cut off, Ti Ying appealed to the emperor by 
arguing that a person could not recover from such a punishment119 and 
offered herself as a slave in exchange for mercy.120  Ti Ying’s filial piety 
compelled the emperor to abolish all corporal punishment.121  Deterrence 
“was always the goal of punishment,”122 but Imperial China also utilized 
“more elaborate means to supplement such deterrence by benevolence.”123  
Thus, although deterrence remained the main priority in determining 
                                                      
110  Id.  
111  The Chinese Revolution of 1911, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/chinese-rev (last visited May 6, 2014). 
112  XIN REN, supra note 83, at 41. 
113  Id. at 42.  
114  Id.  
115  Id.  
116  Id.  
117  Jianhong Liu et al., supra note 34, at 23. 
118  Id.  
119  See id. at 21 (explaining that Ti Ying argued such a permanent punishment would not be 
conducive to education and reform, which are integral to Confucianism: because if her father committed 
the same crime in the future, then he would have no nose to cut off).  
120  Id. at 23.  
121  Filial piety is an ethic of Confucianism.  Id.  
122  Bakken, supra note 92, at 38. 
123  Id. 
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punishments, 124  the frequent use of legal mercy in Imperial China 
demonstrates that the Chinese legal tradition never advocated for only 
granting the harshest punishments in order to achieve deterrence.  
B. Confucianism’s Influence Remains Embedded in Chinese Law and 
Culture Despite Prior Anti-Confucian Movements  
Some scholars contend that Confucianism’s benevolence and Imperial 
China’s exercise of legal mercy have been lost in modern society.125  In 
1949, the Communist Party’s victory in the Chinese Civil War initiated a 
philosophical severance with Confucianism.126  In spite of this severance, 
Confucianism has “a profound influence in shaping Chinese legal thinking 
and criminal justice practices,”127 which is reflected in the current trend of 
handling a large portion of minor criminal cases through extra-legal means, 
such as mediation.128  Therefore, the main themes of Legalist severity and 
Confucian benevolence still resonate in current Chinese criminal law.129   
1. The Communist Party of China Explicitly and Violently Rejects 
Confucian Principles  
After the Communists came into power in 1949, “the old legal 
machinery was officially abolished and condemned as a political accessory 
of the . . . regime that had suppressed and exploited the working class.”130  
The Communist Party attempted to sever China’s “innate connection” with 
Confucianism by emphasizing the philosophy’s elitism and political 
hierarchy.131  Initially, Marxism exerted a humanizing influence on China’s 
criminal justice system because Marxism viewed the death penalty as a cruel 
punishment that should be abolished. 132   The Communist Party even 
formally suggested that the death penalty be abolished in 1922.133  However, 
this view lost influence during the subsequent periods of war and 
revolution. 134   Criminal law became an “important weapon for class 
struggle,” particularly through severe punishments for those people 
                                                      
124  See id. 
125  Id. at 37.  
126  Jianhong Liu et al., supra note 34, at 20. 
127  Id.  at 28. 
128  See id.   
129  Id. at 24; see also Lewis, supra note 41, at 317. 
130  XIN REN, supra note 83 at 47. 
131  Id. at 48.  
132  Bakken, supra note 92, at 39. 
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considered enemies of the state.135  The Communist Party had no incentive 
to use legal mercy because China’s penal law primarily sought to “suppress 
the enemies and protect the people.”136  Although Chinese-Marxist discourse 
frowned upon the use of the death penalty, the new regime continued to use 
it, claiming that it was necessary “at this stage of development.”137   
Mao Zedong’s political and societal sway during the Cultural 
Revolution, from 1966 to 1976,138 also contributed to the declining influence 
of Confucian legal mercy in modern Chinese criminal law.  Although Mao 
Zedong viewed the death penalty as a limited tool to be used against 
counter-revolutionaries, he nevertheless advocated that the people take 
revenge upon their former oppressors through executions.139  Mao Zedong 
justified this position by citing the death penalty’s deterrent and punitive 
effects, asserting that, “it is necessary to create terror for a while in every 
rural area”140 to constrain the landlords’ exercise of power, as well as to 
“assuage the people’s anger.”141  During this period, mercy acquired a 
negative connotation; one Cultural Revolution slogan stated that “to show 
mercy to the enemy is to show cruelty to the masses.”142  Mao Zedong’s 
framing of the Cultural Revolution as a battle between friends and enemies 
of the people transformed the revolution’s understanding of crime from 
something merely prohibited by the state to something deviant and evil.143   
Even after the Cultural Revolution, the government had little use for 
Confucian mercy, because the death penalty became a “visible means of 
social control” largely driven by political, social, and economic 
conditions.144  The government framed the 1983 “Strike Hard” campaign as 
a response to increased criminal activity. 145  However, it was truly meant to 
suppress unruly youth and reinforce the party’s legitimacy by proving that 
the government was in control of the negative social consequences of its 
economic reforms.146  During this period, more crimes became punishable 
by death and provincial courts obtained the power of the Supreme People’s 
                                                      
135  JIANFU CHEN, supra note 15, at 15-16. 
136  Michelle Miao, Capital punishment in China: A populist instrument of social governance, 17 
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 233, 238 (2013). 
137  Bakken, supra note 92, at 40. 
138  RICHARD CURT KRAUS, THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 1 (2012). 
139  Bakken, supra note 92, at 40.  
140  Id.  
141  Id.  
142  Miao, supra note 136, at 236.  
143  Bakken, supra note 92, at 40. 
144  Bin Liang, supra note 22, at 120.   
145  Bakken, supra note 47, and accompanying text. 
146  Id. 
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Court to reevaluate death penalty sentences.147  Many have been troubled by 
“wrongful convictions and inconsistent imposition” of the death penalty by 
provincial courts. 148   Thus, allowing provincial courts to review these 
sentences resulted in an increased number of executions.149  Additionally, 
authorities played up the inflated crime rates, but in actuality, China’s crime 
rates in 1983 were the lowest since 1979 and among the lowest in the 
world.150  Simultaneously, judicial corruption and the ambiguous wording in 
the Criminal Law led to a rash of inconsistent and unjust sentences, 
frequently including executions for petty crimes, such as car theft, purse 
snatching, and infamously, pinching a woman’s buttocks.151 
The absence of legal mercy also caused the government to focus its 
usage of the death penalty on portions of the population without political 
power.  Although officials exaggerated the overall crime rate, juvenile crime 
rates did rise, making juvenile gangs the primary targets.152  Authorities 
executed gang members as young as sixteen, but these sentences did not 
deter crime because gang networks multiplied.153  The government also 
worried about increases in economic crime, but anti-crime campaigns 
particularly targeted juvenile gang leaders rather than corrupt officials or 
businessmen.154  This reaction can be attributed to “moral panic about 
disorderly youth in a rapidly changing society,”155 a moral panic brought 
about by the destruction wrought by Mao Zedong’s teenage Red Guards 
during the Cultural Revolution that ended in 1976.156   With his fears 
exacerbated by the rise in juvenile crime, Party Leader Deng Xiaoping 
concluded that public executions would be the “indispensable means” 
through which the public would be educated on the consequences of not 
following party policy.157  However, instead of deterring crime, China’s 
crime rate rose dramatically after the early 1980s, right when the “Strike 
Hard” campaign began, and the number of death sentences carried out 
peaked at 6100 in 1996.158  By initiating national “Strike Hard” campaigns 
that primarily targeted youths, the government rejected Confucianism and 
                                                      
147 Kandis Scott, Why Did China Reform Its Death Penalty?, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 63, 65 (2010).  
148  Id. at 75-76. 
149  Id. at 65. 
150  Bakken, supra note 47, at 68. 
151  Id. at 80.  
152  Bakken, supra note 47, at 67; Nestor, supra note 12, at 539. 
153  Bakken, supra note 47, at 68.  
154  Id. at 67. 
155  Id.  
156  See Edward Cody, China’s Lost Generation Coddles Its Young, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2004), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8691-2004Nov23.html. 
157  Bakken, supra note 47, at 79. 
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embraced the death penalty as the primary means of deterrence and social 
control, a strategy that ultimately did not achieve the desired results.159  
2.  Confucianism’s Influence Endures in Current Mechanisms of Legal 
Mercy and Political Principles, Despite Attempts to Eradicate It 
Although the rehabilitation of Confucianism has been slow within the 
Communist Party,160 the Chinese government recently “provided qualified 
support for the Confucius revival.”161  In 2007, former President Hu Jintao 
promoted a series of official slogans with Confucian undertones, such as 
“harmonious development.”162  Additionally, more people study Confucius’ 
works, and the Party publicly supports Confucius’ philosophy by sponsoring 
commemorations of Confucius and embracing Confucian values even at the 
Party’s administrative levels.163  This resurgence can be attributed to people 
seeking “ways to adapt to a culture in which corruption has spread and 
materialism has become a driving value” 164 —two issues President Xi 
Jinping pledged to tackle in his current campaign against corruption.165  
Political corruption greatly contributed to the widening income gap and was 
the “root cause of its disintegrating social safety net and the prevailing 
political apathy.”166  In other words, the Chinese people seek a body of 
ethical principles that will, as President Xi Jinping puts it, 
“promot[e]…morality across society . . . [and stress] the importance of 
cultural prosperity.”167  These principles include an emphasis on order, 
balance and harmony, as well as respect for authority and concern for 
others.168  
                                                      
159  See supra Part II.   
160  Confucius Makes a Comeback, ECONOMIST (May 17, 2007), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/9202957. 
161  Dexter Roberts, Confucius Makes a Comeback in China, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-01/confucius-makes-a-comeback-in-china. 
162  Id.; Confucius Makes a Comeback, supra note 160. 
163  See Maureen Fan, Confucius Making a Comeback in Money-Driven Modern China, WASH. POST 
(July 24, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/23/AR200707230 
1859.html (noting that in one county of Henan Province, officials seeking promotions are evaluated by 
friends, relatives, co-workers, and members of the public on how well they care for their parents.  Thus, 
whether or not they get a promotion depends on how well they embody the Confucian values of filial piety 
and family responsibility).  
164  Id.  
165  See China Ex-Rail Minister Given the Suspended Death Sentence, supra note 1. 
166  Ying Zhu, supra note 78.  
167  Xinhua Insight: China Sees Renewed Enthusiasm for Confucius, XINHUANET (Dec. 7, 2013), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/07/c_132949742.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2014). 
168  Confucius Makes a Comeback, supra note 160.  
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Although the rise of Communism eradicated the social and political 
structure of traditional Confucianism, its principles “remain inherent in 
Chinese psychology and underline East Asian people’s attitude and 
behavior.”169  Marxism’s status as a new political ideology necessitated a 
pre-existing foundation upon which its principles could be successfully 
absorbed into Chinese culture. 170   Confucianism’s “long inculcation” 
allowed for an easier adoption of Marxism-Leninism, particularly since the 
Marxist atheist tradition focusing on changing the present world “is 
analogous to the Confucian secular thinking of world harmony.”171 
Elements of Confucianism still exist in present Communist doctrines 
and principles, or implicitly in the underlying structure of society.172  For 
example, Confucian benevolent principles can be seen in the Criminal Law’s 
prohibition against executing children under eighteen and women who are 
pregnant at the time of trial.173  Article 67 of the Criminal Law reflects the 
Confucian practice of exercising mercy to those who confess and repent,174 
which provides that someone who voluntarily surrenders and truthfully 
confesses to their crime “may be given a lighter or mitigated punishment.”175  
A “relatively minor” crime may also be exempted from punishment 
completely.176   
Additionally, Confucian legal mercy endures in formal mechanisms 
emphasizing education through benevolence rather than severity.  
Confucianism advocates education as a means of deterrence.177  Likewise, 
mediation stems from Confucian principles because the process seeks to 
restore a broken relationship by respecting the feelings and humanity of both 
the victim and the offender. 178   Additionally, in 2003 the Chinese 
government officially adopted community correction and initiated pilot 
                                                      
169  Hang Lin, supra note 77, at 6-7. 
170  XIN REN, supra note 83, at 48.  
171  Id.  
172  Hang Lin, supra note 77, at 7.  
173  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 
14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 49 (China), translated in http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/ 
Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm. 
174  XIN REN, supra note 83, at 42.  
175  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 
14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 67 (China), translated in http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/ 
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176  Id.   
177  Jianhong Liu et al., supra note 34, at 21.  
178  See id. at 24-25.  
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programs in six provinces and municipalities. 179   After prisons release 
criminals on parole, they can serve out the rest of their sentence through 
community service.180   Similarly, community correction centers provide 
temporary accommodation and skills training for people who leave prison 
with little support system.181  The Sunshine Midway House in Beijing, 
designed to accommodate 5000 people, refers to attendants as “trainees” to 
“ensure their human dignity.”182  Since then, the successful practice of 
community corrections, which “reflects the restorative values of . . . 
traditional Confucianism in building a harmonious society,” continues to 
expand. 183   Community correction programs expanded to all thirty-one 
Chinese provinces in 2009.184   
Finally, just as Imperial China balanced Legalist severity and 
Confucian mercy, the current “integration of leniency and rigidity” acts as 
the “basic criminal justice policy in China.”185  Members of the October 
2006 Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China clearly advocated this stance by suggesting 
reforms of the juvenile justice system and expansion of the community 
correction mechanisms.186  Even the Sunshine Halfway House recognizes 
that they must provide both warmth and seriousness towards their trainees 
because “community correction is still a form of penalty.”187  The Chinese 
Criminal Law frequently uses terms such as minor, relatively minor, 
relatively serious, and particularly serious to denote mitigation and 
aggravation factors.188 This all indicates that Chinese criminal law does 
include Confucian principles of benevolence.  
IV. APPLYING LEGAL MERCY TO A SELECT GROUP OF PEOPLE CREATES A 
PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRADICTION AND PRACTICAL INCONSISTENCIES 
Given the fundamental Confucian principle of benevolence and the 
frequent use of legal mercy for all types of crimes in Imperial China,189 the 
                                                      
179  Shanhe Jiang et al., Community Corrections in China: Development and Challenges, 94 THE 
PRISON J. 75, 76 (2014). 
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Confucian principles inherent to Chinese society connect to the Chinese 
government’s goal of egalitarianism. 190   Egalitarianism “accompanied 
China’s Communist revolution,” even if it did not apply in practice.191  In 
particular, Mao Zedong was “obsessed with trying to create a more 
egalitarian social order,” even in comparison with the Soviet Union.192  
Although Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms largely eroded Mao Zedong’s 
socialist ideals after the Cultural Revolution, current President Xi Jinping 
demonstrated an “egalitarian streak” in addressing concerns over the 
growing wealth gap in China.193  This includes his clampdown against lavish 
spending by the government, excessive waste of food, and political 
corruption.194  Similarly, although a “clear tension” exists between the elitist 
and egalitarian principles in Confucianism,195 the philosophy does place a 
“very high priority on the welfare of the citizenry.”196  As a result, the 
current application of benevolent Confucian principles in China should be 
extended to all criminals potentially facing the death penalty, not just those 
with power or money.   
Equality before the law is both an international human rights norm197 
and an important feature in the Criminal Law.  Article 4 states that the “law 
shall be applied equally to anyone who commits a crime,”198 stressing that 
“no one shall have the privilege of transcending the law.”199  Ideally, this 
would prevent individuals from evading negative repercussions by 
exploiting their high social or political privileges.   
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(Aug. 23, 2004).   
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14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 4 (China), translated in http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/13/content_1384075.htm. 
199  Id.   
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Under the Chinese Criminal Law, both economic and violent crimes 
can merit the death penalty.200  Article 48 of the Criminal Law states that the 
death penalty “shall only be applied to criminals who have committed 
extremely serious crimes.”201  Courts can grant death penalty sentences for 
economic crimes like embezzling more than 100,000 yuan,202 as well as 
violent crimes such as homicide203 or rape204 in certain circumstances.  The 
Criminal Law does not distinguish between violent and economic crimes in 
capital cases, allowing a two-year suspension of execution if the court does 
not deem immediate execution necessary, and mandating that all death 
sentences be submitted to the SPC for verification and approval.205  In a 
2006 opinion, the SPC emphasized the need to differentiate treatment of 
convicted criminals, requiring courts to look at “both the offense’s harm to 
society and the individual characteristics of the defendant.”206  However, this 
recommendation appears to benefit only corrupt government officials for 
whom the death penalty is a possibility, but almost never a reality.207   
Judges’ use of benevolent principles in death penalty cases for corrupt 
government officials but not for others, in spite of the identical legal 
frameworks that govern both, violates the right of equality before the law. 
Although Communist China initially rejected Confucianism as propagating 
elitism and hierarchal authoritative structures,208 Confucian principles of 
benevolence and humaneness remain a strong influence on modern Chinese 
law.209  Recently, China attempted to balance severity with leniency by 
decreasing death penalty application.210  However, the failure to apply 
benevolent principles to all those who commit crimes that may result in the 
death penalty211 betrays both the Chinese legal traditions of leniency and the 
Communist goal of equality under the law.212  Despite A) China’s recent 
attempts to curb its usage of the death penalty, B) courts do not apply 
benevolent principles in all cases of violent crime, C) resulting in an unequal 
                                                      
200  See, e.g., id. at Art. 236, 239, 383(1).  
201  Id. at Art. 48.  
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application of the death penalty that proves inconsistent with the Chinese 
legal and cultural tradition.        
A. China’s Attempts to Decrease the Use of the Death Penalty in Recent 
Years Indicates Mindfulness of the Balance of Severity and Leniency 
Although scholars and lawmakers continue to debate how to properly 
balance leniency with severity,213 the Chinese government’s recent measures 
“aimed at reducing the number of capital sentences” evidences its efforts to 
implement this balance.214  The SPC issued a 2010 report directing lower-
level courts to “ensure the death penalty only applies to a very small number 
of criminals who have committed extremely serious crimes,” and to limit 
sentences mandating immediate execution.215  In 2011, China reduced the 
number of offenses punishable by death from sixty-eight to fifty-five.216  
This reduction mainly eliminated the death penalty for certain economic and 
non-violent offenses, such as smuggling cultural relics, and gave provincial 
courts the option of granting two-year suspended death sentences217 if the 
courts do not deem immediate execution necessary.218  If an inmate behaves 
well during the two years, his or her sentence can be commuted to life, 
which generally amounts to a twenty-five year sentence.219  In addition, the 
SPC aimed to strengthen and limit the application of the death penalty by 
reforming the trial procedures for death penalty appeal cases, as well as 
detailing rules on conducting death penalty review and specific evidence 
rules.220   
However, critics point out the rarity of an appeals court overturning a 
lower court’s death penalty sentence.221  Furthermore, economic crimes such 
as tax fraud, smuggling of cultural relics, and tomb robbing rarely results in 
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the death penalty.222  Amnesty International criticized the reduction in 
crimes punishable by death as “legal housekeeping,” 223  although it is 
possible that legislators concluded that these crimes involve less harm than 
violent crimes and thus do not merit the death penalty.224  Yet, the fact that 
China’s executions still number in the thousands demonstrates that China 
may not have succeeded in substantially lowering the number of executions 
each year.225   
B. Courts Do Not Apply Benevolent Principles to All Persons Accused of 
Violent Crimes, Including Non-Public Officials Who Allegedly Killed 
in Self-Defense 
Hou Qinzhi became the first person to benefit from the provincial 
courts’ ability to sentence people to a two-year suspended execution.226  A 
court convicted him of stabbing an inspector during a brawl.227  Courts have 
not applied the same benevolence, however, in all cases involving violent 
crimes.  For example, in September 2013, the SPC upheld the death penalty 
for Xia Junfeng, a street vendor who claimed that he had stabbed two local 
officials to death in self-defense after they repeatedly beat him.228  Although 
the Court ruled that there was no evidence of self-defense,229 Xia Junfeng’s 
case sparked backlash from thousands of people, including human rights 
lawyers in China who stated that the uncertainty in the case should have 
prevented the SPC from approving an immediate execution.230  Although 
legal experts identified holes in the prosecution’s case, including a lack of 
credible witnesses and contradictory statements, the state executed Xia 
Jungfeng.231 
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In addition, in 2012 the government executed Li Yan for murdering 
her husband who frequently beat her and inflicted other abuse, such as 
cutting off one of her fingers, stubbing cigarettes out on her face, and 
locking her outside in the freezing Sichuan winter for hours.232  Li Yan 
sought help several times from the police who took photographs of her 
injuries, but otherwise did nothing.233  When Li Yan asked local justice 
department officials about a divorce, they told her that she would be left 
destitute unless her husband agreed to one, so “she was better off tolerating 
the abuse.”234  The local women’s federation and neighborhood committees 
merely informed her that they could not intervene in family disputes.235  
Three months after her final failed attempt to get help, Li Yan killed her 
husband after he drunkenly threatened to shoot her and subsequently beat 
and kicked her.236  Li Yan claimed the accidental killing occurred when she 
hit him over the head with the gun barrel to stop his abuse.237  In 2013, the 
SPC approved Li Yan’s death sentence238 despite outrage239 from tens of 
thousands of people both within and outside China who called for the halt of 
her execution.240  
Li Yan’s case is one of many whereas Hou Qinzhi’s good fortune is 
rare.  Chinese courts have perpetrated a troubling trend of executing or 
jailing thousands of domestic violence victims who killed or injured their 
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abusive husbands.241  Approximately eighty percent of the female prisoners 
in Fuzhou, Fujian province and sixty percent of female prisoners in Anshan, 
Liaoning province convicted of killing or injuring their husbands were 
domestic violence victims.242  Out of the 121 women in Sichuan prison 
convicted of killing or injuring their husbands, seventy-one were given 
suspended death sentences or life imprisonment and twenty-eight were jailed 
for at least ten years.243  Li Yan’s situation is illustrative of a disturbing 
tendency by the courts to punish victims without taking into account the 
circumstances of the crime.  
C. Unequal Application of Confucian Benevolence and Humanness 
Proves Inconsistent with Chinese Legal and Cultural Values  
Modern China utilizes Confucian principles of benevolence in its 
criminal justice system.244  However, an inherent dissonance exists between 
exercising Confucian mercy and humanism for government officials by 
handing down mitigated punishments, but not doing so for others.  Although 
many public officials’ crimes involve bribery, embezzlement, or 
collaboration scams with other officials,245 many public officials and other 
politically-connected individuals are treated more leniently even after 
committing murder.246  Not only does this betray the Chinese legal tradition 
of balancing severity with mercy, but only applying benevolence to those in 
power completely undermines the Communist Party’s current attempts to 
remedy growing social inequality.247  
Leniency for public officials is codified into law.  For example, the 
2011 Criminal Law amendment introduced a stipulation that criminals found 
guilty of murder, rape, or kidnapping who had their death sentences 
commuted must serve at least twenty-seven years in prison.248  In contrast, 
public officials convicted of embezzlement or bribery and given suspended 
death sentences are not included in the scope of the amendment. 249  
According to the Criminal Law, public officials with suspended death 
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sentences will only serve thirteen years in prison; however, they may be 
released even earlier.250  Similarly, many Chinese scholars share the view 
that the death penalty is “an inappropriate form of punishment for economic 
crimes.”251  Statistics from one province indicate that ninety percent of death 
penalties are imposed for crimes such as murder, robbery, rape, serious 
bodily injuries, and major thefts.252  However, scholars also acknowledge 
that, while abolition of the death penalty may be politically unrealistic, “the 
problem . . . is not just that it is too common; its application lacks strict 
control.”253 
Concerns about a lack of strict control manifest in the unequal 
application of sentencing procedures in embezzlement and bribery crimes.  
Although a court can sentence an individual who embezzles more than 
100,000 yuan254 to death if the crime is deemed “especially serious,”255 
courts often do not invoke this option in cases concerning public officials.256  
Song Chenguang, a senior political advisor, and Han Guizhi, the former head 
of the advisory body of Heilongjiang province, were both convicted of 
accepting bribes and received the suspended death sentence.257  Former 
chairman of the state-run oil company, Sinopec Chen Tonghai, was also 
given a suspended death sentence in 2009 for accepting bribes totaling about 
195.73 million yuan. 258   Zheng Ziansheng, head of the Mingzhen 
Management Committee, was sentenced to a suspended death sentence for 
embezzling over one hundred million yuan and accepting over twenty 
million yuan in bribes. 259   Suspended death sentences are normally 
commuted to life imprisonment; therefore, officials receiving this sentence 
are not expected to face execution.260  Furthermore, public officials with 
suspended death sentences will only serve thirteen years in prison, perhaps 
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less.261  In contrast, courts appear willing to execute private citizens under 
the same law.262  For example, former senior trader at a Chinese securities 
company, Yang Yanming, was executed for embezzling and 
misappropriating 94.5 million yuan in 2009,263 and former CEO of a state-
owned gold and silver refinery, Song Wendai, was executed in 2012 for 
embezzling eighty-seven million yuan.264  Currently, the average sum of 
money involved in corruption cases involving high-ranking officials is 
10 million yuan, or USD 1.6 million.265  Although many public officials’ 
embezzlement and bribery convictions surpass the death penalty’s statutory 
threshold, their crimes often do not result in a death penalty sentence.266  
Given the fact that private citizens have been executed for embezzlement267 
but many officials have not, 268  Chinese courts appear to be utilizing 
Confucian principles of benevolence in their choice not to execute these 
officials. 
The predominant group sentenced to death is composed of people 
with little education and social standing.269  Chinese lawyers note that 
“capital punishment is linked to social inequality.”270  Of note is the fact that 
courts impose the death penalty most often for violent crimes when civilians 
clashed with government or law enforcement officials.271  This difference 
appears gendered as well, since most women convicted of killing their 
husbands serve life sentences whereas most men who beat their wives serve 
only several years.272  In 2009, for example, police in the Dong Shanshan 
case dismissed all eight reports of domestic violence as “family 
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problems.”273  After beating his wife to death, the husband merely received a 
jail sentence of six and a half years for “maltreatment.”274  Compared with 
Li Yan, who murdered her husband in self-defense after enduring extreme 
abuse,275 this treatment is just one instance in a trend where men and women 
who kill their spouses do not receive similar sentences.276  
Courts unequally apply Confucian benevolence in cases comparing 
the treatment of public officials or people of influence who commit murder 
and “lowly” common people who commit murder.277  Food vendor Xia 
Junfeng, convicted of “intentional homicide,”278 was executed for killing 
two officials allegedly in self-defense.279 In contrast, local officials who 
killed watermelon vendor Deng Zhengia during a violent dispute received 
sentences ranging from 3.5 to 11 years in prison for “intentional injury.”280  
Parallel to Xia Junfeng’s situation, a fight escalated from Deng Zhengia’s 
resistance of the local officials’ enforcement of an urban code 281  and 
eyewitnesses observed the entire proceeding.282  Although witnesses assert 
that an official struck Deng Zhengia on the head with a weight from his 
hand-held scale, police stated that Deng Zhengia merely “unexpectedly fell 
to the ground and died.”283  Just as the courts discounted holes in the case 
against Xia Junfeng that may have indicated his acts of self-defense were 
justified,284 the facts and surrounding circumstances were ignored here.  
Comparatively, Gu Kailai, the wife of a former high-ranking 
Communist Party leader and daughter of a “celebrated revolutionary,”285 
committed premeditated murder over a commercial disagreement.286  Gu 
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Kailai killed a British businessman by pouring rat poison and cyanide mixed 
with water down his throat.287  Gu Kailai, whose mental state was taken into 
account by the court,288 was given the suspended death sentence, which will 
be commuted to life in prison.289  However, Gu Kailai could be released 
from jail after serving nine years on medical parole grounds.290  In contrast, 
despite the fact that the officials Xia Junfeng killed have a “reputation for 
heavy-handed enforcement of city ordinances,” 291  the SPC found no 
evidence of self-defense in his case.292  Although both Xia Junfeng and Gu 
Kailai expressed remorse and cited self-defense, only Xia Junfeng received 
the death penalty. 293   Not executing Gu Kailai for an admittedly 
premeditated murder but executing Xia Junfeng in a case where the facts are 
in dispute can be attributed to Gu Kailai’s class background of hailing “from 
China’s elite” whereas Xia  Junfeng comes “from the nation’s masses.”294 
The Chinese legal tradition consists of both severe punishment295 and 
mercy.296  Chinese citizens founded modern China because they were not 
content with societal structures that oppressed the less privileged. 297  
Although the government touts deterrence as a primary goal of China’s 
criminal justice system,298 the justification that death penalty deters crime 
appears to only apply to those who lack a certain social, economic, or 
political status.  Although Xia Junfeng and Gu Kailai both killed a person, 
allegedly in self-defense, only the politically connected criminal still lives 
today.299  Contrary to Chinese legal traditions of benevolence300 and equality 
under the law,301 the courts only applied legal mercy to one of “China’s 
elite.”302  Furthermore, given the circumstances surrounding Li Yan’s crime, 
executing domestic violence victims would not likely deter this particular 
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crime.303  Exercising Confucian principles of benevolence and humaneness 
in crimes for public officials, but not for those without political or financial 
power, contradicts both China’s strong cultural values and the goal of 
equality under the law.  
V. SOLUTIONS TO RESOLVING THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN CHINA’S 
UNEQUAL DEATH PENALTY POLICY AND LEGAL TRADITION  
The law does not exist in a vacuum; China’s death penalty policy 
reflects both the social and political climate of the time.304  Even Chinese 
scholars now admit that “you cannot prove [the death penalty’s] 
effectiveness.”305  Furthermore, since deterrence does not conclusively deter 
crime, the Chinese government should not punish non-government officials 
more severely.  Since the courts apply Confucian principles of benevolence 
to crimes committed by those in power, the courts should also extend these 
principles to everyone else.   
Since this inequality in the administration of the death penalty often 
occurs at the policymaking and lower court levels, there are several steps 
that could rectify this problem.  The Chinese government could balance 
severity and humanness by A) increasing transparency in court decisions in 
death penalty review cases, B) mandating a wider amount of mitigating 
factors for each individual case to ensure an appropriate sentence, and 
C) establishing a formal clemency process where those sentenced to death 
can seek pardon or commutation of their sentence after all judicial appeals 
are exhausted. 
A. Greater Transparency Regarding SPC Decisions in Death Penalty 
Cases Would Improve Consistency and Fairness in Sentencing 
The SPC should increase the transparency of their decisions so that 
lawyers, defendants, the media, and the general public understand the basis 
of their decision to strike down or uphold a capital sentence.  The judicial 
system is “famously opaque, and details of the court proceedings remain 
impossible to verify.”306  The mystery surrounding the SPC’s death penalty 
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review process led to uncertainty regarding the fairness and suitability of the 
review process.307   
Nevertheless, the SPC should release their deliberations and reasoning 
for many types of capital sentence review cases, including both economic 
and non-economic crimes.  Releasing this information would be useful for 
the lower courts so that they could effectively guard against unjust or overly 
punitive capital sentences, and it would allow parties concerned with China’s 
death penalty policy to examine any discrepancies in sentencing 
procedures.308  Given the ambiguity in some of the statutory language, 
examples of what exactly constitutes a minor, relatively minor, severe, or 
relatively severe mitigating factor309 would aid lower courts in properly 
taking those factors into consideration.  Perhaps the court in Li Yan’s case 
considered an unknown factor that lead to the decision to uphold her 
sentence in the face of seemingly apparent mitigating factors.  Without any 
way to determine the basis of the SPC’s decision, all that is left is a sense 
that an injustice occurred, which demonstrates a greater, troubling trend.  
B. Greater Usage of Mitigation Factors in Any Individual Case Ensures 
Appropriate Punishment and Crime Deterrence 
Amnesty International noted in a 1998 report that Chinese courts do 
not take mitigating circumstances into account when sentencing criminals.310  
In particular, legal experts state that judges tend to overlook the mental state 
of the defendants during the commission of the crime.311  For example, Xie 
Shuigui received the death penalty after arranging the murder of her older 
brother, who used to rape and beat her, while Zhang Hanbin was executed 
for killing his son.312  Zhang Hanbin tried to kill himself and his son after a 
series of tragic events left them unable to survive much longer.313  The 
Criminal Law includes statutory mitigating factors such as age, pregnancy, 
mental capacity, or physical disability.314  Additionally, an SPC 2006 opinion 
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directed courts to consider both the crime’s harm to society and the 
particularized characteristics of the defendant during sentencing.315  While 
this mandate from China’s highest court calls for the use of mitigation 
factors, they may not be utilized in practice.  Judges have a tendency not to 
consider mitigating factors such as the mental state of the defendant, 
particularly in non-economic crimes.316   
However, judges should be able to identify “crime[s] of a particularly 
severe nature” in order to properly calculate mitigating factors in 
sentencing.317  Certain scholars propose that the severity of economic crimes 
should be determined by examining the enormity of the crime, severity of 
personal injury and death, damaged caused to property, and the degree of 
subjective evil character.318  In order to remain true to the spirit of Article 4 
in the Criminal Law,319 courts should also carefully consider evidentiary 
factors in non-economic crimes.  Since the death penalty appears to exercise 
no conclusive deterrent effect on the commission of future crimes,320 the 
courts have no excuse to punish non-economic crimes much more harshly.  
Instead, the courts must ensure that the ultimate sentence is punitive to the 
appropriate degree.  
 
C. Establish a Clemency Process to Seek Pardon or Commutation of a  
Death Sentence Consistent with International Humanitarian Norms 
 
Many international instruments mandate the right to seek clemency 
through pardon or commutation of sentence after the exhaustion of judicial 
appeals, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,321 to which China is a signatory, but not a party.322   This respected 
right is so widespread that it is considered a rule of customary international 
law. 323  Imperial China frequently utilized the practice of widespread 
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amnesties absolving criminals for all crimes,324 and at least had an informal 
means to petition the emperor325 in its history.  However, no procedure 
currently exists under Chinese criminal law for those sentenced to the death 
penalty to seek pardon or commutation of their sentence.326 
Concerns such as the commonplace usage of forced confessions that 
lead to miscarriages of justice and potential lack of access to defense 
attorneys at all stages of the process necessitates a meaningful clemency 
process. 327   This clemency process should not “become a meaningless 
formality without genuine consideration for the case.”328  Achieving a fair 
and substantive review of an applicant’s case by the courts requires allowing 
the applicant to raise any considerations that they find relevant, including 
issues that may not have been raised in the original court proceedings.329  
Furthermore, the applicant should remain informed about their case and the 
execution must not take place before the clemency proceedings conclude.330   
VI. CONCLUSION 
An inconsistency exists with the Chinese Communist Party’s 
campaign to address societal inequality and the legal tradition of balancing 
Confucian humanness and Legalist severity when the courts fail to exercise 
leniency for people who are not government officials or part of “China’s 
elite.”331  Article 4 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 
created a statutory requirement that the law apply equally to all, regardless 
of privilege. Studies cannot conclusively prove that the death penalty 
actually deters crime.  Furthermore, Confucian principles have endured in 
spite of Communist China’s initial rejection of the philosophy, manifesting 
in statutory and procedural mechanisms that promote benevolence in the 
criminal justice system.  Imperial China granted Confucian legal mercy 
included all citizens.  This benevolence works in conjunction with 
Communist China’s foundational goal of working to cease the exploitation 
of the many by the few in power because it extends the privilege of legal 
mercy to all citizens.     
Only applying legal mercy for the most final of punishments—death—
to people with power encompasses exactly the inequality modern China was 
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founded to counteract.332  Public officials or well-connected individuals with 
political power receive the suspended death sentence for corruption and 
receive lighter penalties for acts of premeditated murder.  On the other hand, 
an abused wife and a man who murdered his assailant after being repeatedly 
beaten were executed.  This inequality encompasses neither the balance of 
humanness and severity utilized in imperial China, nor the egalitarianism 
sought by those who founded modern China.  Since the Chinese criminal 
justice system primarily aims to deter crime,333 the fact that more death 
penalty sentences has not been proven to deter crime means that no 
justification exists in executing people without considering mitigation 
factors.  Otherwise, the courts focus solely on punitive harshness, rather than 
actual reform and deterrence.   
 While the Chinese criminal justice system introduced several 
procedural and substantive reforms that aim to improve accountability and 
appropriate sentencing, an inequality still remains as to whom these reforms 
are applied.  China can take several measures to improve equitable 
sentencing procedures: 1) increasing transparency by releasing SPC 
guidance cases concerning the death penalty so it is clear what constitute 
especially egregious crimes judicially interpreted to be worthy of the death 
penalty, 2) mandate the utilization of mitigation factors and examine the 
context of the crime as a whole for all cases, and 3) establish a formal 
clemency process to seek a pardon after exhausting all judicial appeals. 
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